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ABSTRACT 
In the past generation, restitution law has emerged as global phenomenon.  From 
its Oxbridge home restitution migrated to the rest of the Commonwealth, and ongoing 
Europeanization projects have brought the common law of restitution into contact with 
the Romanist concept of unjust enrichment, further internationalizing this movement.  In 
sharp contrast to the Commonwealth, in the United States, scholarly interest in 
restitution, in terms of books, articles, treatises, symposia and courses on restitution is 
meager, at best.  Similarly, while restitution, equity and tracing cases receive 
considerable treatment at the highest levels of the English judiciary, U.S. courts do not 
seem interested in these issues, and unlike Commonwealth courts, rarely produce theory-
laden opinions that attract scholarly attention.  The situation is particularly curious 
because restitution is thought to be the invention of late nineteenth century American 
scholars.  Moreover, as late as the 1970’s, the vitality of American restitution was 
favorably contrasted with the dearth of such law and scholarship in England.  
 
This article explains this divergence.  I argue that the Commonwealth restitution 
discourse is largely a product of pre- or anti-realist legal thought which generates 
skepticism within the American academic-legal establishment.  The paper identifies the 
two dominant camps in American private law thought—the left-leaning 
redistributionalists and the center-right law and economics movement—and shows that 
neither has any use for the Commonwealth’s discourse.  I conclude by analyzing the 
emerging drafts of the Restatement of Restitution and forecast the future of American 
restitution law.
I. A Brief History of Restitution 
 
All over the world, and especially in commonwealth countries, the law of restitution 
has virtually taken over the realm of private law theorizing.  While the starting date of 
any movement is inevitably a dicey question, the publication of Peter Birks’ An 
Introduction to the Law of Restitution in 1985 has initiated a steady stream, perhaps even 
a geometric progression, in the growth of restitution law and scholarship.  From its 
Oxbridge home, via the influence and prestige of the BCL degree, restitution has 
migrated to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Israel and the rest of the Commonwealth. 
Ongoing Europeanization projects have also brought the common law of restitution into 
contact with the Romanist concept of unjust or unjustified enrichment and created a truly 
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international movement of restitution scholarship.1 The past twenty-five years have 
witnessed a global renaissance of restitution reflected in hundreds, perhaps thousands of 
books and articles, scores of conferences and even a Restitution Law Review all dedicated 
to exploring this growing area of the law.2
The United States remains a notable holdout to this global movement.  Since the 
publication of Birks’ watershed volume, I am aware of only one book published on the 
American law of restitution—a book written by an Israeli law professor and published by 
an English press (Cambridge), and which contains far more Commonwealth and 
 
1 See, e.g., UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT: CASEBOOKS ON THE COMMON LAW OF EUROPE SERIES (Beatson and 
Schrage eds, 2003); UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT: KEY ISSUES IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, (Johnston 
and Zimmermann eds, 2002); UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON THE LAW OF 
RESTITUTION (P.W.L. Russe1l, ed., 1996).  
2 An incomplete and unorganized list of recent books includes, UNDERSTANDING UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
(Hart Oxford 2004); RESTITUTION, PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE; ESSAYS IN HONOR OF GARETH JONES 
(Hart Oxford (1998) (Cornish ed.); IN SEARCH OF PRINCIPLE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LORD GOFF OF 
CHIEVELEY (Oxford 1999) (Swadling ed.); RESTITUTION (Lionel D. Smith ed.) (Aldershot: Ashgate 2000); 
Andrew Burrows, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, (Butterworths: London 2.ed, 2002; 1.d ed. 1993); Robert 
Stevens, RESTITUTION IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford University Press, 2003); Hanoch Dagan, 
THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION (Cambridge Press, 2004); Jacques Etienne du Plessis, COMPULSION 
AND RESTITUTION: A HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE TREATMENT OF COMPULSION IN 
SCOTTISH PRIVATE LAW WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON ITS RELEVANCE TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 
AND UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT (Edinburgh Stair Society, 2004); UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (P.W.L. Russell, ed.) (Amsterdam VU University 
Press, 1996); George B. Klippert, UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Toronto Butterworths, 1983); UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT: THE COMPARATIVE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (Eltjo J.H. Schrage ed.) 
(Berlin Duncker & Humblot, 1995); Mitchell McInnes, RESTITUTION: DEVELOPMENTS IN UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT (Deakin Law School, Legal Resources Project, 1996); Andrew Burrows and Ewan 
McKendrick CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (Oxford University Press, 1997); THE 
RESTITUTION RESEARCH RESOURCE (Oxford, England Mansfield Press, 1994); Peter Birks, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985); Jack Beatson, THE USE AND 
ABUSE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT: ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1991); 
LAW COMMISSION [OF GREAT BRITAIN], RESTITUTION OF PAYMENTS MADE UNDER A MISTAKE OF LAW 
(London: H.M.S.O. 1991); Peter Birks, RESTITUTION: THE FUTURE (Annandale, New South Wales: 
Federation Press, 1992.); New South Wales Law Reform Commission, RESTITUTION OF BENEFITS 
CONFERRED UNDER MISTAKE OF LAW (Sydney: New South Wales Law Reform Comm. 1987); Scottish 
Law Commission, RECOVERY OF BENEFITS CONFERRED UNDER ERROR OF LAW (Edinburgh: Scottish Law 
Commission, 1993); RESTITUTION AND BANKING LAW (Francis D. Rose, eds.) (Oxford: Mansfield Press, 
1998); RESTITUTION AND INSOLVENCY (Francis Rose ed.) (Mansfield Press 2000); Andrew Skelton, 
RESTITUTION AND CONTRACT (Oxford: Mansfield Press, 1998); Ian McNeil Jackman, THE VARIETIES OF 
RESTITUTION (Sydney, Federation Press, 1998); Goff and Jones, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, (London, 
Sweet and Maxwell 1998) (now in its fifth edition); Peter Birks, UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Oxford, 2005) 
(second edition); Lionel Smith, THE LAW OF TRACING (Oxford 1997); Craig Rotherham, PROPRIETARY 
REMEDIES IN CONTEXT (Hart Pub. Oxford 2002); Steve Hedley, RESTITUTION: ITS DIVISION AND ORDERING 
(London Sweet & Maxwell 2001); THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (Hedely & Halliwell eds.) (Butterworths 
2002). The bibliography in Hanoch Dagan’s THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION, offers a bibliography 
that is complete as of the date of its publication.  
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international materials than a comparable work on the American law of contracts or 
torts.3 The lone treatise was written in the 1970’s and reflects the scholarly modality of a 
different era.4 No more than two or three, out of more than 170 U.S. law schools, offer a 
course devoted exclusively to restitution, nor, should a school want to offer such a 
course, is there an updated restitution casebook to use for the course.5 Only a handful of 
conferences have been dedicated to restitution, and these events are typically dominated 
by non-U.S.-based scholars.6 Finally, leading U.S. contracts casebooks, the place 
American lawyers are most likely to learn anything about restitution, offer a hesitant, 
uncertain and (from the Commonwealth perspective) under-rationalized account of unjust 
enrichment.7 In sum, none of the excitement and stimulation that prevails in the rest of 
the common law world is to be found in the U.S. academy.8
This situation is particularly curious, because the modern law of restitution is thought 
to be an invention of American scholars.  Restitution was most likely conceived at 
Harvard Law School in the late 1880’s and early 1890’s, and certainly emerged from the 
womb by the time William Keener published his treatise, A Treatise on the Law of Quasi-
Contracts in 1893. 9 The field seemed to be on solid footing by the time the American 
 
3 See Hanoch Dagan, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION (Cambridge, 2004). 
4 George E. Palmer, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (1978 & Supp 2006). Professor Andrew Kull is of the 
opinion that though Palmer published his treatise in 1978, the bulk of the work was done in the at least 
twenty years earlier. (Telephone interview February 2007). 
5 To the best of my knowledge, the most recent casebook devoted exclusively to restitution is the 1969 
edition of Dawson and Palmer’s CASES ON RESTITUTION (this in a country that at least has numerous 
casebooks devoted to Art law, Animal law, Elder law, Sports law, etc.). Note that Commonwealth scholars 
have produced several casebooks for use in courses dedicated exclusively to restitution, see Andrew 
Burrows and Ewan McKendrick, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (1997); Sieg 
Eiselen & Gerrit Pienaar, UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT: A CASEBOOK (2nd ed. Durban, Butterworths 1999). 
6 See Symposium: Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1763-2197, (2001); Second 
Remedies Discussion Forum: Restitution, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 991 (2003).  
7 For example, Farnsworth et al., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (6th ed. 2001). The casebook 
contains separate sections for unjust enrichment/quasi contracts, precontractual liability and restitution-
based remedies, and makes no serious attempt at connecting the underlying rationales. The same 
organizational structure dominates Farnsworth’s influential three volume treatise, see FARNSWORTH ON 
CONTRACTS (3rd ed. 2004).  
8 See for example the opening paragraph of Michael Sean Quinn’s book review, Subrogation, Restitution 
and Indemnity, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1361 (1996), of Charles Mitchell, THE LAW OF SUBROGATION  (Oxford 
1994). The American author finds it necessary to explain and apologize to his US audience for reviewing a 
dense analytical English book on the “sleepy” law of subrogation. His explanation: it has bearing on a 
redistributional topic. See infra Part IV.   
9 The development of the doctrinal field is sketched out in Andrew Kull, James Barr Ames and the Early 
Modern History of Unjust Enrichment, 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 297-319 (2005); see also 
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Law Institute published the first Restatement of Restitution in 1937—the publication that 
gave “restitution” its name—10and these efforts were further buttressed by several mid-
twentieth century works, most notably, Jack Dawson’s Unjust Enrichment,11 George 
Palmer’s treatise, The Law of Restitution,12 and John Wade’s casebook, Cases and 
Materials on Restitution.13 Writing in 1973, Joseph Perillo noted that while American 
scholars generally recognize the conceptual independence of restitution, in England “it is 
still a mark of legal orthodoxy to deny or ignore the distinction between contract and 
quasi-contract and say that there are only two categories, contract and tort.”14 Similarly, 
as late as 1985, Peter Birks contrasted the relative vitality of American restitution law and 
scholarship with the dismal state of the law then prevailing in England.15 
Restitution petered out in the U.S. sometime between the release of Robert Goff and 
Gareth Jones’ first edition of The Law of Restitution, in 1966, and Birks’ 1985 
publication of Introduction to the Law of Restitution. While Gareth Jones reputedly 
learned his restitution from Dawson at Harvard,16 ultimately the line of scholarship 
growing out of Keener, Seavey and Scott failed to convince the majority of the American 
legal public that restitution is a significant branch of the common law on par with 
contract and tort.  Over the course of the twentieth century, restitution came to be thought 
of as an uncomfortable appendage to contract,17 or property,18 or alternatively, a remedy 
bundled clumsily together with injunctions, specific performance, declaratory relief, 
 
Duncan Kennedy, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 177-181; Joseph Perillo, Restitution 
in a Contractual Setting, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1210 (1973); R. Jackson, THE HISTORY OF QUASI CONTRACT 
IN ENGLISH LAW (1936); James B. Ames, A History of Assumpsit, 2 Harv. L. Rev 1 (1888). 
10 Seavey and Scott saw themselves as introducing restitution to the world, see W. Seavey & A. Scott, 
Restitution, 54 L. Q. R. 29, 31 (1938); See also Peter Birks, A Letter to America: The New Restatement of 
Restitution, 3 GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS (2003) (discussing the controversy surrounding the name of the 
First Restatement). 
11 John P. Dawson, UNJUST ENRICHMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1951). 
12 George Palmer, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (Little and Brown 1978). 
13 John W. Wade, CASES AND MATERIALS ON RESTITUTION, (1958) & (2nd ed. 1966).  
14 Joseph Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual Setting, 73 COLUM. L. REV.1208, 1210 n.19 (1973). 
15 See Birks, INTRODUCTION at 3 (“In America, where lawyers have undoubtedly been more alive to 
[restitution]. . .”). 
16 See John Langbien, The Latter History of Restitution, in RESTITUTION: PAST PRESENT AND FUTURE 
(1998).  
17 See supra note _ (Farnsworth casebook). 
18 See James Rogers, Restitution for Wrongs and the Restatement (Third) of the Law of Restitution,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=927979 (2006).  
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damages calculations, punitive damages, and a grab-bag of doctrines that were once 
known as equity.19 But the idea of a unified field, combining quasi-contracts, 
reformation of deeds and constructive trusts, has not quite persevered in American legal 
thought.  Thus, even as U.S. courts episodically rely on the First Restatement to supply a 
rule of decision in a given case, the analytical framing of these decisions typically 
proceed under the rubric of some codified area of the law (e.g., Federal Bankruptcy Code, 
UCC, ERISA, insurance regulations),20 or through the lens of contract, tort, property and 
trust, but most often contract and tort.21 The idea, now quite popular in the 
Commonwealth, that restitution is its own body of law with policies and principles 
distinct from contract and tort, has not enjoyed similar vitality in American jurisprudence. 
 
While the rebirth of restitution in the Commonwealth has been fueled principally by 
academic scholarship, this success would be impossible without the receptivity of the 
courts.  Since the early 1990’s, the English House of Lords decided several important 
restitution cases, affording the Oxbridge scholars a chance to argue their views into the 
law.22 Moreover, at times it seems that the entire block of litigation known as the Swaps 
Cases were essentially an extended session of one of Birks’ celebrated Oxford seminars 
with the Law Lords participating as diligent students.  While the English academics 
initially piqued judicial interest in a rational account of restitution, the enthusiastic 
involvement of the House of Lords legitimated the enterprise, encouraging further 
academic discussion.  Restitution is a joint enterprise of the bench and the academy.  
 
19 See, e.g., Laycock, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES (Third Edition, 2002); Weaver, et al., REMEDIES:
CASES PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AND EXERCISES (2004); Rendelman, REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 
(Sixth Edition 1999); Leavell et al., EQUITABLE REMEDIES, RESTITUTION AND DAMAGES (7th Ed, 2005). 
20 See, e.g. In re Omegas Group, Inc., 16 F.3d 1443 (6th Cir. 1994) (Bankruptcy Code); Great-West Life & 
Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, (2002), (ERISA); First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Fidelity Bank, 
Nat. Ass'n, 724 F. Supp. 1168 (E.D.Pa. 1989) (UCC). More generally, UCC Articles 4 and 4A govern cases 
of mistaken bank payment and wire transfers, the scenarios which Birks treated as the “core” restitution 
cases.    
21 See infra Part V.  
22 The House of Lord’s restitution canon contains an unusual number of citations to the scholarship of the 
English academy. See, e.g., Woolwich Equitable Building Society v. IRC [1993] AC 70 (HL) (citing 
Professor Birks); In Re Goldcorp Exchange [1995] 1 AC 74 (citing Professors Goode and Birks); 
Westdeutsche  Landesbank v. Islington, [1996] AC 669 (HL) (extensive discussions of Professors Birks and 
Burrows); Kleinwort Benson v. Lincoln C.C.[1998] 3 WLR 1095 (citing Professors Beatson and Burrows); 
Foskett v. McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102 (citing to Professors Hayton and Birks, and interestingly, American 
scholars Austin Scott and George Palmer). 
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While restitution, trust, tracing and equity cases all receive considerable treatment at 
the highest levels of the English judiciary, 23 in the U.S., courts barely seem interested in 
the matter.  To be sure, there are plenty of cases regarding unjust enrichment, quasi 
contracts, constructive trusts, tracing, reformation of deeds and the refunding of mistaken 
payments, most often in the context of commercial transactions gone awry. But these 
cases are rarely presented before the highest courts, and in any event, do not result in 
theory-laden opinions that attract scholarly attention.  The cases are treated summarily, 
little more than the day-to-day work product of the courts. 24 The overall tone and texture 
of the American cases contrast sharply with the urgency and significance that permeates 
the leading English cases. 
 
This article explains the divergence in restitution between the U.S. and the 
Commonwealth. I argue that the Commonwealth restitution discourse is largely a 
product of pre- or anti-realist legal thought which thus generates skepticism from the 
mainstream American academic establishment.  The paper then identifies the two 
dominant camps in American private law thought, the left-leaning redistributionalists, 
and the center-right law and economics movement, showing why neither camp has much 
use for the Birksean restitution discourse.  The paper concludes by analyzing the lone 
exception to the overall U.S. indifference—the emerging drafts of the Restatement of 
Restitution—and a discussion of the direction of restitution scholarship in America. 
 
II. The Analytic Basis of Commonwealth Restitution 
 
The resurgence of the modern law of restitution is justly credited to the lifelong 
work of Peter Birks.  Though two editions of the Goff and Jones treatise preceded Birks’ 
Introduction, Birks was the first Commonwealth scholar to offer a comprehensive and 
schematic account of the field.  Moreover, Birks’ reputation as an engaging and admired 
teacher and scholar drew rising academic stars from around the world to his Oxford 
 
23 E.g., Lipkin Gorman,[1991] 2 AC 458; Woolwich Equitable Building Society v. IRC [1993] AC 70 (HL); 
In Re Goldcorp Exchange [1995] 1 AC 74; Westdeutsche  Landesbank v. Islington, [1996] AC 669 (HL); 
Kleinwort Benson v. Lincoln C.C.[1998] 3 WLR 1095; Foskett v. McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102.  
24 Compare e.g., Lackey v. Lackey, 691 So.2d 990 (Miss. 1997) with Foskett v. McKeown [2001]1 A.C. 
102. 
Draft, March 26, 2007  Saiman, Restitution in America
7
seminars, which in many ways is responsible for the global proliferation of restitution.25 
Goff and Jones collected cases, but Birks generated the analytical superstructure to justify 
them.  
 
Though the core substantive elements of restitution have been part of the common 
law from time immemorial, Birks argued that historical accidents, misunderstandings, 
unfortunate fictions and mismatched metaphors prevented the central unity of restitution 
from coming to light, and left restitution scattered about the sea of the common law.26 
Birks found many of the doctrines to reside uncomfortably at the margins of contract and 
property, others simply known as equity, and yet others tucked away in what Birks 
termed contextual fields: family law, insurance law, securities law and the like. 
 
Birks’ Introduction sets out to remedy this problem and offer a unified, 
rationalized and coherent account of restitutionary liability.  The thesis is based on 
differentiating restitution from contract and tort on the one hand, and from proprietary 
and equitable remedies on the other.  Under this scheme, “contract” is defined 
analytically, in terms of its “causative event,” which is the parties’ consent (known also 
as the will theory)27 rather than as a contextual category describing liabilities arising 
loosely within the framework of an agreement.28 Similarly, the causative event of torts or 
wrongs is the defendant’s breach of a legal duty.29 When these two categories are 
accurately defined, it becomes clear that the common law contains an additional category 
premised that is not premised on consent (e.g. quasi contract, quantum meruit, duress, 
incapacity, failure of consideration, mistake, frustration of purpose, illegal contracts, 
unenforceable contracts, etc.), and which can be explained with greater specificity than 
 
25 E.g., Lionel Smith (Canada); Robert Chambers (Canada); James Edleman (Australia and Oxford); Kit 
Barker (Australia); Ross Grantham (Australia); Yeo Tiong Min (Singapore); Kelvin Low (Hong Kong); 
Eoin O’Dell (Ireland).  See also Steve Hedley, RESTITUTION: ITS DIVISION AND ORDERING 207-08 (2001).  
26 See Peter Birks, INTRODUCTION at 4-5. 
27 See Peter Birks, Private Law at 5, in LESSONS OF THE SWAPS LITIGATION (Mansfield Press 2000).  
28 Birks, id. Private Law at 5.  
29 Peter Birks, The Concept of a Civil Wrong in David Owen, THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT 
LAW 31-51(1995). 
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simply constituting a breach of a legal duty (e.g. cases of disgorgement and certain 
instances of constructive trust). These doctrines form the body of restitution.30 
Having identified the causative event of restitution as unjust enrichment, Birks 
turns his attention to the way the law remedies unjust enrichment.  This led Birks to a 
daring attempt to establish order in the conceptual minefield of what American lawyers 
generically refer to as constructive trusts: the hodgepodge of doctrines comprised of bits 
of property law, trust law, rights in rem (or proprietary remedies) and equitable defenses, 
remedies, liens, and subrogation.  Birks claims that proprietary remedies are best 
understood as the response to correcting certain forms of unjust enrichment.  The 
nettlesome question lies in identifying exactly which forms of unjust enrichment merit an 
in rem remedy and why.  While Birks discusses this issue somewhat abstractly—in terms 
of taxonomy and analytic classification—the issue is of immense practical importance as 
well.  A number of courts have struggled with whether an unjust enrichment claimant 
(typically the victim of something between mistake and fraud) should be allowed to take 
priority over unsecured creditors in the event of the defendant’s insolvency.31 
Birks’ framing brings his assumptions about the nature of both unjust enrichment 
and property to the fore.  Underlying the theory is a view that property rights are created 
and maintained by rules of law, and a general denial of a court’s power to assign or 
distribute property rights.32 In Birks’ own words: 
 
30 Over the years, Birks changed his mind on several key points in the analysis of restitution. See e.g., 
Birks, Misnomer in RESTITUTION PAST PRESENT AND FUTURE; (retracting the idea that restitution is limited 
to the legal response to unjust enrichment, and that the sole remedy for unjust enrichment is restitution); 
Birks UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2003) (rejecting the common law “four factors” analysis in favor of civilian 
“lack of basis” approach). See also Steve Hedley, RESTITUTION: ITS DIVISION AND ORDERING (2001) 
(explaining that Birks attempted  to maintain the validity of his thesis by (i)differentiating between unjust 
enrichment and the law of wrongs, (ii) arguing that fault has only a minimal function in restitution, and (iii) 
continually reducing the coverage of unjust enrichment as a legal explanation). Despite these not 
insignificant shifts, Birks’ methodology remained fairly constant throughout his career, and at all points his 
analysis contrasts sharply with the U.S.-based approached. See infra Parts II-IV. 
31 See e.g., In Re Goldcorp Exchange [1995] 1 AC 74; In re Polly Peck (No. 2) [1998] A.E.R. 812 (CA); 
Fortex Group [1998] 3 NZLR 17 (NZCA). In Re Omegas Group, 16 F.3d 1443 (6th Cir. 1994). 
32 See Craig Rotherham, PROPRIETARY REMEDIES IN CONTEXT (2001) 33-40 (associating Birks with the 
“absolutist” view of property).  
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When the law of property has done its job, on what principle could 
any court rely on to adjust the result? A single step in that direction 
would be the beginning of an impossible inquiry, just the kind of 
impossible inquiry which was once thought to be threatened by the 
law of unjust enrichment, until it was realised that the law of unjust 
enrichment was not a discretionary frolic in distributive justice.33 
Thus, when a court awards an in rem remedy to certain assets, it is because (and 
only because) the underlying concepts of unjust enrichment and property mandate such a 
result.  Therefore, every remedial grant must be precisely and exactingly justified in 
terms of a pre-rationalized basis of liability.  This rationalization effort is the central task 
of unjust enrichment theory.  
 
The goal of Birks’ restitution discourse is to bring these related doctrines under a 
single heading.  This will help identify the common legal principles at work, and reframe 
the sprawling case law in terms of the causative event of unjust enrichment and its 
legitimate legal responses.  Once presented in analytic terms, the concept of unjust 
enrichment, typified by the core case of a mistaken payment, becomes the basis for 
further development in hard cases.34 This reconstruction is said to achieve three related 
goals that are often associated with formal modes of legal analysis: (i) to ensure that like 
cases are treated alike, (ii) to provide a deductive framework for the analysis of novel 
questions, moving the system towards its ideal of gaplessness, and (iii) to restrain judicial 
forays into unbridled redistributive projects.  This final goal of judicial restraint, while 
always important, is particularly necessary in a field where “unjust” serves as the central 
term in the legal discourse. 
 
To understand the disparity between U.S. and Commonwealth approaches to 
restitution, it is important to locate the mode of Birks’ argument within the family of 
jurisprudential thought.  Birks’ writing shares deep affinity with the reconstruction 
projects of the late nineteenth century—when contract and tort were fashioned out of the 
 
33 Peter Birks, The End of the Remedial Constructive Trust?, 12 TRUST LAW INTERNATIONAL at 208. 
34 Birks, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 3-18 (2004).  
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remnants of the actions of assumpsit and trespass on the case.35 Most obviously, it is a 
coherentist project, which assumes the underlying (if unrecognized) coherence of the 
legal rules.  Second, the account is conceptual.  The rules that comprise restitution are 
seen to cohere around distinctly analytic principles which are first extracted from existing 
case law and then relayed back into the case law via deductions from the concept of 
unjust enrichment.  The assumptions of coherence and conceptualism result in the view 
of law whereby conceptual analysis, when performed by the expert jurist, leads to the 
correct resolution of even the most difficult of legal disputes.  
 
Birks himself expresses this sentiment quite vividly.  In discussing whether a 
constructive trust should be awarded as a response to unjust enrichment, Birks wrote:  
Some legal concepts [property] ought never to be 
deconstructed. . . .  
The question whether a claim deserves priority in 
insolvency is an impossible question. By contrast, the 
questions whether the plaintiff has a proprietary interest, 
and, if so, from what moment that interest takes its priority, 
are technical conceptual questions, which a lawyer can 
hope to answer. 
. . . Lawyers have no special competence in distributive 
justice.  They cannot be expected to say who deserves 
what. But, given a decent law library and some time to do 
the work, a lawyer can be expected to say. . .  whether on 
given facts a proprietary interest has arisen, and, if so, 
precisely of what kind.36 
It is exactly this mode of reasoning (expressed in rather extreme fashion by 
Birks), that lies at the foundation of the modern restitution enterprise, and which 
engenders deep skepticism within U.S. academy.  Though the legacy of American legal 
realism is justly debated,37 a recurring feature of the movement is its looming suspicion 
of categoric divisions between doctrinal headings such as public and private or contract, 
 
35 Birks understood this well, See UNJUST ENRICHMENT at 3 (comparing his project in restitution to the late 
19th century projects in contract and tort). 
36 Birks, The End of the Remedial Constructive Trust? 12 TRUST LAW INTERNATIONAL 202, 214-215 
(1998). This passage is cited and critiqued in Craig Rotherham, PROPRIETARY REMEDIES IN CONTEXT, 38-
39 (2002). 
37 E.g., Hanoch Dagan, The Realist Conception of Law, U. TORONTO L. REV. (forthcoming). 
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tort and restitution.38 This skepticism is a subset of a more general suspicion of the 
explanatory power of inductive and deductive modes of legal reasoning and argument.  In 
one popular retelling, the key insight of realism was to render the categorical description 
of the law meaningless since the lines between the doctrinal categories were shown to be 
permeable and could be made to bend at will.39 Realists similarly doubted that legal 
reasoning alone could decide which category any given case fit into, or even whether it 
was possible to provide a consistent description of the legal category itself.  As a result, 
realists began to look for extra-doctrinal justifications for legal outcomes.  Explaining the 
decision via the conceptual analysis of legal rules would no longer do.  
 
More developed iterations of the critique explained that cases defied easy 
categorization because each decision was subject to conflicting considerations between 
competing, and in some sense irreconcilable, objectives.  Every instance of adjudication 
presents a localized act of balancing between competing interests that the legal system 
can neither fully realize nor reconcile.40 On this view, the law is effectively a moving 
average of decisions.  Further, because precedents inevitably point in both directions, the 
search for underlying coherence is bound to end in failure, as ongoing litigation ensures 
the systematic reproduction of conflicting data points throughout the legal canon.  The 
realists thus understood that while judges inevitably balance these conflicting rules, their 
decisions cannot be justified via reference to the indeterminate rules or precedents 
themselves.41 Moreover, to the extent that legal principles exist, they are the 
irreconcilable interests that reside at the edge a legal field, rather, than as Birks would 
have it, at the very center.   
 
38 E.g., Morton Horwitz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960 at 198-208 (1992). 
39 See id.  
40 See Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s 
“Consideration and Form” 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94 (2000). 
41 The text itself was written by John Gardner in an unpublished 1934 writing titled, Observations on 
the Course in Contracts. While in the first (1947) edition of the Fuller casebook this statement 
appears in a section titled The Basis of Contractual Liability (p. 297-98), in more recent editions this 
observation secures a prestigious spot in the introduction to the entire course, on page 4. See Fuller 
and Eisenberg, BASIC CONTRACT LAW (8th Edition 2001).   
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Perhaps one of the clearest statements of this theory, and one particularly relevant 
to contracts and restitution, appears in the opening chapter of Lon Fuller and Melvin 
Eisenberg’s classic contracts casebook.  
 
The ethical problems involved in the law of contracts result. . .  
from four elementary ideas.  1. “The Tort idea” [reliance]. . . 2. 
The bargain idea- [classical contract theory predicated on the will 
theory]. . .3. The promissory idea, i.e., that that promises are 
binding in their own nature and ought be kept in all cases. 4. The 
Quasi-Contractual Idea, [corresponding to unjust enrichment].   
These ideas which at first seem trite and wholly 
harmonious are in fact profoundly in conflict.  The first and the 
fourth proceed from the premise that justice is to be known after 
the event. .  . The second and the third proceed from the premise 
that that justice is to be known before the event in transactions 
voluntarily entered into.. . .  the conflict between these two 
standpoints is perennial; it can be traced though the history of the 
law of contracts and noted in nearly every debatable question; 
there is no reason to think that it can ever be gotten rid of or to 
suppose that the present compromises of the issue will be any more 
permanent than the other compromises that have gone before.  
 
While there was broad agreement amongst the realists that the motivation for 
legal outcomes is not the doctrinal rules themselves, but something else.  Exactly what 
that something else is has been the concern of most mid-to-late twentieth century legal 
theory.  The proposals differ wildly, from law and economics based efficiency concerns, 
to moral reasoning, to critical theories from the perspective of class, race, gender and 
ideological affiliation, to political science and institutional design models, accounts based 
on historical accidents, public choice theories and so forth.  What these movements share, 
however, is their realist heritage.  They agree that the move from cases to broader 
principles and then back down to a specific decision is neither descriptively accurate of 
what courts actually do nor a sufficient legitimization of the results.  Post-realist 
American legal thought is an ongoing search for a compelling replacement to traditional 
doctrinal analysis.42 
42 Formalism of course exists in the U.S. However, at present it seems to be anchored in a discussion about 
the role of texts, particularly as related to public law. There seems to be little equivalent to Birks’ 
conceptual mapping of the private law. Even Justice Scalia, America’s most celebrated essentialist-
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For reasons too complex to outline here, this view of law was never as influential 
in England and the Commonwealth, as the success of the Birksean restitution project 
bears proof.43 This is not to suggest that there are no doctrinally skeptical post-realist 
voices in the English academy.44 But this is to suggest that the intellectual climate of the 
English and Commonwealth academy affords the possibility that pre (or anti-) realist 
strand of scholarship will find a home in the elite segments of the academy which exerts 
significant influence over the elite bench and bar.  Similarly, I do not mean to suggest 
that Commonwealth restitution scholarship is monolithic.45 Birks’ views are far from 
being unanimous, and in many important respects were far too Romanist for common 
lawyers, as the Australian experience bears out.46 Moreover, several of his theories were 
loudly rejected by the House of Lords,47 and Birks himself notoriously changed his mind 
regarding several key points of analysis.48 Nevertheless, the jurisprudential techniques 
employed by Birks continue to frame the Commonwealth’s restitution scholarship.  In 
short, it was Birks, not Atiyah, who produced graduate students, institutions and a trans-
national scholarly movement.   
 
III. Restitution & Realism 
formalist maintains a post-realist vision of the common law.  See Scalia, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION at 
10-14 (1997).   
43 The most comprehensive attempt to address this issue remains Patrick Atiyah and Robert Summers, 
FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW (1987); see also Richard Posner, LAW AND LEGAL 
THEORY IN THE UK AND USA (Oxford 1996); see also Neil Duxbury, Why Is English Jurisprudence 
Analytical, 57 Current Legal Problems 1 (2004). 
44 There certainly are, and from this side of the Atlantic, the Birkbeck school appears to lead the field in the 
U.K. 
45 See, e.g., Andrew Burrows, Contract, Tort and Restitution – A Satisfactory Division or Not?” 99 L.Q.R. 
217 (1983). 
46 See e.g., Roxborough v. Rothmans, [2001] 208 CLR 516 at 544 (AU): 
Considerations such as these, together with practical experience, suggest caution in 
judicial acceptance of any all-embracing theory of restitutionary rights and remedies 
founded upon a notion of "unjust enrichment". To the lawyer whose mind has been 
moulded by civilian influences, the theory may come first, and the source of the theory 
may be the writing of jurists not the decisions of judges. However, that is not the way in 
which a system based on case law develops; over time, general principle is derived from 
judicial decisions upon particular instances, not the other way around. 
See also id. at note 112 citing scholarly commentary to the same effect.  
47 E.g., Westdeutsche  Landesbank v. Islington, [1996] AC 669 (HL). 
48 Supra note __. 
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While the overall theoretical orientation of legal realism is at odds with Birks’ 
analysis of private law, the realists’ deconstruction of contract and property raise 
particular difficulties for the reception of the Birksean restitution discourse into American 
legal thought.  
 
A.  The Reliance Interest in Contracts 
No publication has been more influential to American conception of contract law 
than Lon Fuller’s justly celebrated The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages.49 A
number of scholars, including, interestingly, Patrick Atiyah,50 have claimed this to be 
“the best,” “the most influential,” or “the most important” contracts article ever written.51 
Hyperbole aside, Fuller’s analysis has been extraordinarily influential and established the 
framework for the damages sections in the Restatement Second of Contracts.52 
Fuller finds that damages in contract cases vindicate three severable interests: (i) 
the expectation interest, traditionally thought to be predicated on the bargain between the 
parties; (ii) the tort-like reliance interest, which looks to compensate the plaintiff for 
losses caused by the defendant; and (iii) the restitution interest, which vindicates 
defendant’s unjust enrichment in favor of the plaintiff.53 These three interests bear more 
than passing resemblance to Birks’ tripartite division between contract, tort and 
restitution.  But whereas Birks saw each as representing a separate and divisible basis of 
private law liability, Fuller finds that each interest informs the “core” of contract law 
itself.  Similarly, while Birks saw unjust enrichment as generating its own heading of 
liability, Fuller sees the prevention of unjust enrichment as the most compelling case for 
recoveries “on the contract.”54 Reliance presents the next most attractive rationale, while 
 
49 42 YALE L. J. 52 (1936). 
50 P. Atiyah, Fuller and the Theory of Contract, ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 73 (1986). 
51 See Todd Rakoff, Fuller and Purdue’s “The Reliance Interest” as a Work of Legal Scholarship, 1991 
WISCONSIN L. REV. 203, 204n.7 and sources cited therein. 
52 See RESTATEMENT SECOND CONTRACTS § 344 (outlining the three interests articulated by Fuller), see 
also Hudec, Restating the "Reliance Interest," 67 CORNELL L. REV. 704 (1982) (documenting influence of 
Fuller’s article on the Restatement (Second) of Contracts).  
53 Lon Fuller and William Purdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L. J. 52 (1936). 
54 The Reliance Interest at 56, 67-68. 
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damages based solely on the parties’ expectation, traditionally, the heart of contract 
damages, offers the least compelling rationale.55 
Having inverted the traditional hierarchy, Fuller demonstrates that the divisions 
between the three interests are more imagined than real.  Fuller’s breakdown of the 
reliance/restitution distinction presents a key component of the realist aversion to Birks’ 
scheme. Fuller argues: 
 
The inescapable flexibility of the concept of benefit means that 
drawing the line between reliance and restitution interest is in the 
end a rather arbitrary affair. By substituting for “benefit” a stricter 
term like “enrichment” we shift the line in one direction; by 
substituting a looser term like “performance received by the 
promisor” we shift it in another. In view of the fact that the line is 
set ultimately by a kind of definitional fiat it is remarkable that it 
should have become customary to think of restitution as a remedy 
entirely distinct from the usual suit on the contract. Where “the 
contract” is regarded as furnishing a kind of conduit for the 
ordinary suit, it becomes an obstruction in the way of restitution 
and must be removed by “rescission.” That in this legal 
hydromechanics sight should be lost of the purposes underlying the 
remedies involved can occasion no wonder.56 
The realist in Fuller finds the attempt to create sharp boundaries around core legal 
concepts unsustainable.  Restitution is thus collapsed into reliance, and both are then 
folded into contract.  Reliance (tort), contract and unjust enrichment are not three 
separate causative bases of liability, but are thoroughly enmeshed within the “the law of 
contract” itself.  To American scholars raised in Fuller’s tradition, Birks’ analytic 
division between bases of liability is simply a more sophisticated form of the “legal 
hydromechanics” derided by Fuller.  Moreover, in contrast to Birks, reliance (including 
what Birks calls restitution), rather than mutual agreement, that provides the true 
explanatory basis of most “on contract” recoveries.57 Birks’ definition of contract is thus 
 
55 Id. at 70. 
56 Id. at 72 (emphasis added).  
57 See for example, the discussion in Joseph Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual Setting, 73 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1210 (1973).  
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unsustainable.  Contract cannot be reduced to a single causative basis, since it reflects an 
inseparable amalgam of restitution, reliance and expectancy interests.58 
In the wake of Fuller’s analysis, reliance rather than restitution became the 
primary vehicle through which American scholars analyzed contract liabilities that do not 
neatly fit under the orthodoxy of the bargain theory.  The most famous (if vociferous) 
expression is undoubtedly Grant Gilmore’s The Death of Contract. Gilmore highlighted 
the “schizophrenia”59 of the Restatement of Contracts by claiming that the reliance 
interest expressed in § 90 fully undercut the bargain theory articulated in §75.60 
Subsequent accounts followed suit so that the “reliance” heading became the chief rival 
to the traditional view of contract.61 Even John Dawson, arguably the leading mid-
century restitution scholar, eventually came to accept the core of Fuller’s analysis.62 
Owing to Fuller’s influence, the large theoretical battles over the size and scope of 
contract law were hashed out in terms of reliance.63 Restitution, as a standalone idea, 
received only marginal treatment in the contracts literature, typically relegated to a few 
quantum meruit cases, or as a vehicle for a non-breaching party to recover on a losing 
contract.64 
58 See supra note __.  
59 Grant Gilmore, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT at 67 (1974). 
60 See Gilmore, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT at 62 (citing and crediting Fuller’s Reliance Interest in 
unsettling the bargain theory of contract), and id. at n.147; see also Restatement Second of Contracts, which 
presents reliance under the heading of “Contracts without Consideration” as an alternate to the bargain 
principle, while restitution is analyzed under the heading of “Remedies” where it resides alongside  
measurement of damages, injunctions, and specific performance. See also Hudec, supra.
61 See. e.g., E. Allen Farnsworth, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS, chapter 2 (and note the relative placement 
of restitution vs. reliance.  Marvin Chirelstein, CASES AND CONCEPTS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS chapters 
2 & 8 (5th Edition 2006); Fuller and Eisenberg, BASIC CONTRACT LAW (chapters 1, 2 & 8) (8th Edition 
2001); CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 5th Edition. 
62 See Dawson, Restitution Without Enrichment, 61 B.U. L. REV. at 577-85 (1981). 
63 E.g., Grant Gilmore, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT; Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in 
Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963); Ian Macneil, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 
(1980). See also See Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 232-33 (“Few courts 
have entertained claims for restitution of benefits conferred during failed negotiations. . .   For this reason, 
claimants have usually made claims based on contracts implied-in-fact in addition to or instead of demands 
for restitution, and courts . . .  have generally favored the former ground.”); see also Duncan Kennedy, 
From The Will Theory, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 144-150 (2000).  
64 See e.g., E. Allen Farnsworth et al., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS, 103-112; 486-88 (6th Ed. 
2001). 
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Similarly, while over the past 50 years, American scholars have produced a 
voluminous literature devoted to analyzing off-contract remedies predicated on Fuller’s 
reliance interest, one finds little parallel discussion within the Commonwealth canon.  
While a more complete exploration of this theme is beyond the scope of this article, 
following Fuller, Dawson and Gilmore, much of what Commonwealth lawyers analyze as 
restitution, American courts and scholars frame in terms of reliance. Thus, Fuller’s view 
regarding the substantial overlap between two categories is substantially borne out.65 
B. Property Rights & Constructive Trusts 
While Birks identifies the causative basis of restitution by contrasting it with the 
consent theory of contracts, Birks’ understanding of restitution’s remedial elements is 
predicated on his traditionalist conception of property.  According to Birks, property 
rights can only be generated and distributed on the basis of formal and rational rules, and 
not through exercises of judicial discretion.66 Thus in a recent book, Craig Rotherham 
convincingly contrasts this “absolutist” conception of property assumed by leading 
English scholars, (including Birks), with the realist-inspired “instrumentalist approach to 
property” that dominates American thought.67 
Though the evolution of the instrumentalist conception of property in the U.S. is 
long and complex, important data points no doubt include the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Euclid v. Ambler68 which, despite its own rhetoric, eroded the public/private distinction 
by recognizing the dramatic power of the state to alter, create and extinguish property 
rights. One year later Morris Cohen published his justly famous Property and 
Sovereignty, which furthered this process by demonstrating the degree to which private 
property depended on the compliance of the state’s regulatory apparatus.69 More 
contemporary strands of this analysis include Joseph Singer’s The Reliance Interest in 
 
65 In this regard, see Duncan Kennedy, From The Will Theory, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 144-150 (2000).  
66 See Craig Rotherham, PROPRIETARY REMEDIES IN CONTEXT, 33-40 (2002); Birks, supra 12 Trust Law 
International, at 208.  
67 Morton Horowitz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960 at 146-167 (1992).   
68 Village of Euclid. v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
69 See 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8 (1927). 
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Property,70 as well as Tom Grey’s The Disintegration of Property,71 which carry over the 
breakdown of the contract/tort/reliance distinction into the law of property.  The 
public/private distinction took a further blow as mid-twentieth century courts expanded 
the definition of property to include rights to government entitlements, a trend 
exemplified by the Supreme Court’s holding in Goldberg v. Kelley.72 Overall, the 
prevailing view is that property rights are granted as a function of tradition, policy 
concerns, exigency and the prevailing equities of a case, rather than by categoric 
applications of pre-defined legal rules.73 
Since American theory assumes (if somewhat uncomfortably), that courts do in 
fact create and extinguish property rights, the constructive trust—which posed such a 
difficult theoretical problem for Birks—fails to generate much interest or excitement 
amongst U.S. theorists.  The prevailing “theory” of constructive trusts was stated by 
Cardozo as far back as 1919: “a constructive trust is the formula through which the 
conscience of equity finds expression.  When property has been acquired in such 
circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the 
beneficial interest, equity converts him into a trustee.”74 While courts and scholars no 
doubt disagree over which cases merit this powerful remedy, mainstream scholarship 
places little stock in a doctrinal account that purports to govern this unwieldy and result-
oriented remedy.  The tradition of broad discretion afforded to courts “sitting in equity,”75 
together with the legacy of legal realism, renders most of Birks’ theories unnecessary to 
the American scholar.    
 
Thus the American realist-reductionist approaches the Commonwealth restitution 
discourse with hesitancy and suspicion.  In the realist reading, Birks was concerned with 
judicial remedies that looked more like unprincipled forays into distributive justice than 
 
70 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988).  
71 Reprinted in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII 69 (1980)  
72 394 U.S. 971 (1969). See also Charles Reich’s influential article The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 
(1964).  
73 Morton Horowitz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960 at 163-67 (1992). 
74 Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co. (1919). 
75 See Emily Sherwin, Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEX.
L. REV. 2083 (2001) (discussing different definitions of equity). 
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the application of hard rules of law under a corrective justice framework.  Restitution 
theory, with its learned doctrines and emphasis of precise legalistic taxonomy, is simply a 
scholarly attempt to reverse-engineer a substantive basis of liability that explains the 
outcomes delivered by courts.76 Despite the linguistic and terminological complexity, the 
realist finds the goals of the Birksean restitution discourse to be relatively simple: to 
retroactively legitimate, and proscriptively regulate, the courts’ overtly redistributive 
activities.   
 
IV. Redistributive Restitution 
 
Although U.S. scholars have been notably absent from the Oxonian discourse, a 
different vision of restitution has generated a significant amount of excitement and 
controversy within the American academy.  This restitution discourse is premised on the 
core assumptions of legal realism and openly embraces the court’s redistributive powers.  
Restitution is interpreted as a legal framework through which justice concerns precluded 
by traditional legal doctrine find their expression in the law.77 Thus while the Birksean 
analysis actively suppresses restitution’s equitable history,78 the redistributive version 
explicitly keys off the natural law tones that hover over the terms “unjust” and “equity.”79 
A few recent examples demonstrate this point.  
To the American scholar, the natural law imagery embedded in the term “unjust 
enrichment” makes it an obvious candidate to address arguably the greatest injustice of 
the twentieth century, the Nazi Holocaust.80 While initial attempts at litigating the 
 
76 For example, Birks’ theory encounters most difficulty when attempting to explain the law of tracing 
pursuant to orthodox conceptions of property. Birks was forced to establish an elaborate set metaphysical 
taxonomy in order to explain why no new property rights are created when a plaintiff traces “his” property 
though into the defendant’s now-present assets. See Birks: Overview: Tracing, Claiming and Defences in 
LAUNDERING AND TRACING. See also Rotherham, supra, at 96-106.  
77 See E. Sherwin, Love, Money, and Justice: Restitution Between Cohabitants, 77 COLORADO L. REV. 711, 
713 (2006) (contrasting the vision of unjust enrichment inspired by the legal realists, with a tighter, more 
analytic view represented by Birks). See also RESTATEMENT THIRD OF RESTITUTION § 1 cmt. b.  
78 E.g., Birks, Introduction at 39. 
79 See Sherwin, Restitution and Equity, supra, 79 TEXAS L. REV. (2001) (discussing different views of 
equity); See also the illuminating contrast of English and American rhetoric surrounding subrogation, in M. 
Quinn, Subrogation, Restitution and Indemnity, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1361, 1373-74 (1996). 
80 On Holocaust reparations, see generally, Stefan A. Riesenfeld Symposium on Holocaust Reparations, 20 
BERKELEY J. OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-357; Symposium, Holocaust Restitution, 25 FORDHAM 
INTERNATIONAL L. J. 1-493 (2001).  
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Holocaust in U.S. courts produced little in the way of recovery,81 in the past decade or so, 
restitution-styled claims have borne significant results.82 Of particular note is the $1.25 
billion settlement between Holocaust victims and a consortium of Swiss banks, one of the 
largest settlements relating to a historic injustice.83 
Restitution, in the technical, Birksean sense had little impact in producing the 
settlement.  The process was intensely political, involving (at times, legally questionable) 
moves by all levels of the U.S. government designed to press the Swiss banks to settle.84 
Holocaust litigation however, is obviously about more than restoring “a mistaken 
payment of a non-existent debt.”85 It sets out to redistribute vast amounts of wealth in an 
attempt to loosely, if incompletely, correct for past injustices of unimaginable magnitude.  
The restitution rhetoric is employed in order to enable courts to transcend political, 
temporal, doctrinal and jurisdictional boundaries to achieve substantively just results.  In 
direct contrast to the Commonwealth practice, U.S. discourse values the doctrinal label 
restitution precisely because its natural law underpinnings stress substantive justice over 
analytic theory.  
The recent success of the Holocaust claims has inspired renewed interest in claims 
for restitution by descendants of African-American slaves.86 While this movement has 
 
81 See, e.g., Kelberine v. Societe Internationale, 363 F.2d 989 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (slave labor class action 
lawsuit by Holocaust survivor dismissed); Handel v. Artukovic, 60 F. Supp. 42 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (class 
action lawsuit brought by Holocaust survivors dismissed); Princz v. Federal Rep. of Germany, 26 F.3d 66 
(D.C. Cir. 1994); see generally, Michael Bazyler, Nuremberg in America: Litigating the Holocaust in the 
United States Courts, 34 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 1 (2000).  
81 See, e.g., In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 139 (EDNY 2000). 
82 Michael Bazyler, The Holocaust Restitution Movement in Comparative Perspective, 20 BERKELEY J. OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 11, 12 (2002). 
83 id.  
84 See Bazyler, Nuremberg in America: Litigating the Holocaust in the United States Courts, 34 RICHMOND 
L. REV. at 62-70 (2000).  
85 This is Birks’ formulation of the core case of restitution. Birks, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 3 (2003) (“The law 
of unjust enrichment is the law of all events materially identical to the mistaken payment of a non-existent 
debt.”). 
86 See In Re African-American Slave Descendants Litigation, 304 F.Supp.2d 1027, 1056 (N.D. Ill. 2004) 
(explaining that the “bulk of this relief centers on plaintiffs' claim for restitution”); aff’d in part and 
reversed in part, In re African-American Slave Descendants Litigation, 471 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(Posner, J.). 
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had much less success in practice, it has engendered a wide-ranging debate within the 
legal academy. 87 
While to date, no money has changed hands and a class action lawsuit for 
reparations has recently been dismissed,88 a number of commentators nevertheless note 
that, to the extent these claims have a chance of success, restitution/unjust enrichment 
remains that most promising legal avenue.  The pliability and natural law overtones of the 
word “unjust” help plaintiffs get around the fact that slavery was legal under the positive 
of the pre-Civil War era.  At the more doctrinal level, a suit in restitution obviates the 
need for a showing of direct injury.  Finally, since liability in restitution is strict, plaintiffs 
are relieved from proving negligence or wrongdoing on the part of the defendants, an 
obvious advantage where the suits proceed against those who had nothing to do with the 
actions in question.89 
Perhaps the farthest-reaching use of restitution rhetoric was the $350+ billion 
settlement between tobacco companies and state governments.90 Over the twentieth 
century, the tobacco industry successfully defended tort and product liability claims 
pursued by smokers and their families.91 However, presenting the claims in restitution 
allowed lawyers to structure the suit so that the state rather than the (at fault) smoker was 
the named plaintiff.92 Combining law and economics reasoning with traditional 
restitution theory, the states claimed that the tobacco companies were unjustly enriched 
because they did not internalize the costs of the adverse health effects of smoking.  Since 
 
87 The classic work is Boris Bittker, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (1973), and more recently, 
Randall Robinson, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS (1999). See Eric Posner and Adrian 
Vermule, Reparations for Slavery and other Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 700-03 (2003) 
(arguing that restitution has several advantages over tort in this context); Bernard Boxhill, The Morality of 
Reparation, in REVERSE DISCRIMINATION 270, 275-77 (B. Gross Ed 1977) (unjust enrichment as basis for 
reparations); Anthony Sebok, Should Claims Based on African–American Slavery be Litigated in the 
Courts?, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20001204.html (discussing the centrality of unjust enrichment 
claims in slavery litigation); Hanoch Dagan, Restitution and Slavery, 84 B.U.L. REV. 1139 (2004) 
(expressing openness to the idea that restitution can be used for historic injustices).  
88 In Re African-American Slave Descendants Litigation, 304 F.Supp.2d 1027, 1056 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
89 See Emily Sherwin, The Jurisprudence of Slavery Reparations: Reparations and Unjust Enrichment, 84 
B.U.L. REV. 1443 (2004). 
90 See Doug Rendleman, Common Law Restitution in the Mississippi Tobacco Settlement: Did the Smoke 
Get in Their Eyes 33 GA. L. REV. 847 (1999); Hanoch Dagan & James White, Governments, Citizens, and 
Injurious Industries, 75 NYU L. REV. 354 (2000). 
91 Doug Rendleman, Common Law Restitution in the Mississippi Tobacco Settlement: Did the Smoke Get in 
Their Eyes 33 GA. L. REV. 847, 848-58 (1999). 
92 Id. at 852-86. 
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these expenses were ultimately borne by the public, the states claimed restitution from the 
tobacco industry.93 
Though these claims never received judicial sanction, restitution had a hand in 
producing one of the first major victories against the tobacco companies.  Other factors 
no doubt contributed: the emergence of critical “smoking gun” documents; the testimony 
of insider whistleblowers; and a general shift in public sentiment.  But by naming the 
state rather than the smoker as the plaintiff, the restitutionary cause of action substantially 
changed the underlying equities and pushed the tobacco companies towards settlement.  
A final source of redistributive restitution relates to the division of property 
belonging to unmarried cohabitants.  Here, Canadian rather than American law offers the 
most telling examples.94 Pushing the law beyond Commonwealth norms, 95 the Supreme 
Court of Canada has granted broad remedies to no-longer significant others (typically 
women claiming rights in a men’s property) under theories sounding in unjust 
enrichment.96 The Canadian experience thus offers a mid-point between U.S. and 
Commonwealth modes of thought.  On the one hand, Canadian doctrine exhibits its North 
American tendencies, using common law courts to pursue a social agenda through private 
law litigation.97 On the other hand, many scholars who adhere to the restrained, analytic 
view of restitution argue that the Canadian approach distorts the confined boundaries of 
unjust enrichment.98 
93 Id. at 853.  
94 In the U.S. these questions proceed under a variety of statutory and common law principles, most 
probably this is because restitution is not a compelling enough framework to serve as a doctrinal rallying 
point for this area of law. A comprehensive summary of cases that demonstrates the lack of any cohering 
principle in U.S. law can be found at George Blum, Property Rights Arising from Relationship of Couple 
Cohabiting without Marriage, 69 A.L.R. 219 (5th ed. 2004). See also infra Part VI. 
95 See John Mee, THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF COHABITEES: An Analysis of Equity’s Response in Five 
Common Law Jurisdictions (Oxford: Hart 1999). 
96 See Pettkus v. Becker 117 D.L.R. (3d) 257(1980); Sorochan v. Sorochan, 2 S.C.R. 38 (1986) (household 
work included as enrichment; restitution extends even to property acquired before the couple moves in 
together); Peter v. Beblow 1993 101 DLR 4th 621 (establishing the presumption that domestic service gives 
rise to claims of unjust enrichment; since plaintiff rendered domestic services under “no obligation” she is 
entitled to restitution.). See John Mee, supra (discussing how these cases extend far beyond commonwealth 
norms).  
97 See John Mee, THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF COHABITEES 188 (discussing the impact of the wide ranging 
U.S.-styled constructive trust on Canadian jurisprudence). 
98 Not surprisingly, Birks was an early critic. See Birks, Restitution and Resulting Trusts, in EQUITY AND 
CONTEMPORARY LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 372 n.82 (Goldstein ed. 1992) where Birks critiques the 
Pettkus/Sorochan line as giving too broad a definition of unjust enrichment. Others have followed suit, 
Draft, March 26, 2007  Saiman, Restitution in America
23
The competing images of restitution directly impact the structure and texture of 
the academic restitution discourse.  American scholarship eschews the taxonomic and 
cartographic inquires that typify much of the Commonwealth discourse.99 American 
scholars look to engage directly in the social, economic and moral merits of the 
restitution efforts.100 Thus academic writing overwhelmingly focuses on the substantive 
legitimacy and policy implications of these projects, displaying little concern over the 
analytic structuring of the doctrine.  Not surprisingly, this open-ended redistributive 
discourse generates opposition from scholars committed to a more doctrinal conception 
of restitution.101 
V. Realism from the Right 
The account of legal realism presented so far, particularly the emphasis on 
redistribution, focuses overwhelmingly on left-leaning scholarly and judicial 
interpretations of legal realism.  This agenda however, is deeply contested, and 
encounters strong opposition from neo liberal voices, most notably, the law and 
economics movement.  Like Birks the legal economists oppose pursuing redistributive 
programs under the guise of private law, give far greater credence to the public/private 
distinction, and generally support the will theory of contract.  But while the law and 
economics interpretation of legal realism is at odds with the left-leaning vision sketched 
 
arguing that as understood by the Canadian court, unjust enrichment bears little resemblance to the 
commercial law doctrines from which is allegedly is derived. See Patrick Parkinson, Beyond Pettkus v. 
Becker, 43 U. Toronto L. J. 217, 220-23 (1993); E. Sherwin, Love, Money, and Justice: Restitution Between 
Cohabitants, 77 COLORADO L. REV. 711 (2006). Mee, THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF COHABITEES.
99 Emily L. Sherwin, Legal Taxonomy, http://ssrn.com/abstract=925129 (2006). 
100 This is not to suggest that there is no technical analysis in these cases, but only that the technical 
analysis does not revolve around the analytics of restitution. Rather, the legalistic analysis focuses on 
procedural issues: e.g., standing, subject matter jurisdiction, diversity jurisdiction, federal question, forum 
non conveniens, failure to join necessary parties, and a host of discovery related issues. See, e.g., In Re 
African-American Slave Descendants Litigation, 304 F.Supp.2d 1027, 1056 (N.D. Ill. 2004).  This seems to 
be part of a broader division where American courts focus more on procedural doctrines while English and 
Commonwealth courts expend more energy articulating substantive points. I hope to develop this point 
further through future research.  
101 See Emily Sherwin, Reparations and Unjust Enrichment, 84 B.U.L. REV. 1443 (2004); Birks, 
Restitution and Resulting Trusts, in EQUITY AND CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PROBLEMS at 372 n. 82. 
Andrew Kull (id); Sherwin, Love, Money, and Justice: Restitution Between Cohabitants, 77 COLORADO L. 
REV. 711 (2006) (opposing restitution between cohabitants).   
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above, it shares in the skepticism of classical doctrinal reasoning.102 Therefore, the 
Commonwealth approach to restitution is (albeit for different reasons) equally 
unpersuasive to center–right contingent of the American ideological spectrum.  
 
The differences between Birksean and law and economics approaches is best 
captured by comparing Birks’ Introduction, with an article published the same year by 
Saul Levmore, a leading first-generation law and economics figure.103 At first glance, the 
authors share many of the same concerns.  Both Birks and Levmore are troubled by the 
conceptual disarray prevailing within restitution, as well as the lack of any apparent 
theory guiding judicial decisions.104 Despite raising similar questions however, the 
authors employ substantially different methodologies, and a direct comparison of the two 
writings highlights the incompatibility between these modes of legal analysis.  
 
Consistent with the core insights of law and economics, Levmore assumes that the 
goal of all private law rules—whether denominated contract, tort or restitution—is to 
increase efficiency by channeling transactions to the free market.  Restitution is initially 
thought to be problematic because quasi contract cases enforce un-bargained for 
exchanges as if they were conducted on the open market.  Levmore argues however, that 
upon closer examination, the decisions reached by courts in quasi contract cases actually 
incentivize efficient transactions.  Restitution doctrine is said to produce efficient 
outcomes because recovery is granted only when it is likely to “thicken” the private 
market, i.e., generate markets with many competing buyers and sellers.  On the other 
hand, Levmore finds that restitution is systematically denied where a grant would 
encourage service providers to obtain their fees by circumventing the market.105 
In this account, restitution has nothing to do with preventing unjust enrichment. 
Moreover, unjust enrichment has no core analytic structure, no prototypical case, and is 
not the causative basis of any rights.  It is simply an amalgamation of rules whose 
 
102 See Anthony Kronman, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993). 
103 Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65 (1985). 
104 See id. at 121-124.  
105 Id. at 99, 117.  But see Hanoch Dagan, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION at 147 (2004). 
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contents embody the core goals of all of the private law—promoting efficient 
transactions.  The thinking is thus fully instrumentalist; restitution is granted only when a 
particular remedy in the case at bar encourages market behavior downstream.106 
In a more recent account, Richard Craswell further demonstrates the irrelevance 
of traditional legal categories to law and economics. 107 Craswell argues that the goal of 
any remedial regime (reliance, restitution or expectation) is to produce damage awards 
whose total economic impact incentivizes the most socially productive behavior.  In this 
view, doctrinal headings traditionally associated with specific measures of damages serve 
no purpose; they simply distract the law from addressing the underlying empirical 
question at hand.  Rather than fret about the causative basis of liability, Craswell argues 
that legal analysis should be geared towards identifying which measure of damages will 
optimize socially productive behavior.108 
The economic analysis presents a mirror image of the Commonwealth reasoning.  
Under Birks’ analysis, contract, tort, and restitution provide the “causative event” which 
justifies the award of damages.109 Craswell, by contrast, begins (and ends) his analysis 
with the amount in damages that should be awarded—the “source of liability” or 
“causative basis” never even enters the equation.  Much the same is true of the law and 
economics approaches to property.  Whereas Birks sees property as a foundational 
institution predicated on a fixed set of “orthodox principles,”110 Calabresi and Malamed 
famously argue that property rights should be conceived as freely defeasible interests 
which are economically equivalent (and fully interchangeable) with rights or duties 
stemming from contract and tort.111 Under this framework, the decision whether to grant 
a proprietary or personal remedy has nothing to do with the technical (and indeterminate) 
 
106 71 VA. L. REV. 79-80 (1985).  
107 Richard Craswell, Against Fuller and Purdue, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 99, 107-111 (2000). 
108 Id.  
109 See, e.g., Birks, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 6-8 (2003). 
110 See Birks, Establishing a Proprietary Base 1995 RESTITUTION LAW REVIEW 83, 84. 
111 Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View 
of the Cathedral, 85 HARV L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
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rules of property and/or trust, but depends on which form of relief will actively encourage 
the parties to bargain towards an efficient resolution.112 
While American courts rarely adopt the most radical formulations found in law 
and economics scholarship, in diluted form, this method of analysis works its way into 
U.S. caselaw.  Leading examples are cases of mistaken payment, which, per Birks, 
represent the core rationale for restitution.113 By framing cases of mistaken payment 
cases in terms of the payee’s unjust enrichment, Birks necessarily assumes that the 
negligence by the mistaken payor in initiating the transfer is legally irrelevant.  As one 
U.S. state court put it, “[i]f all persons who negligently confer an economic benefit. . . are 
disqualified from [] relief because of their negligence, then the law of restitution, which 
was conceived in order to prevent unjust enrichment would be of little or no value.”114 
Yet in a number of cases dealing with mistaken bank payments, U.S. courts have 
rejected the unjust enrichment framework and looked instead to the law and economics 
inspired values of efficiency, certainty and finality of transaction.  For example, an 
influential opinion from New York’s highest court denied recovery on account of the 
transferor’s negligence, arguing that it would be more efficient if plaintiff (the cheapest 
cost avoider) was made to internalize the cost of the mistake.115 A Seventh Circuit 
opinion, per Judge Easterbrook, pursued a similar line of analysis, allocating 
responsibility to the party who, ex ante, was in the best position to insure for the mistake 
or contract around it.116 In line with law and economics principles, these cases reject the 
unjust enrichment framing and focus instead on the legal rule that encourages the most 
efficient deployment of precautionary measures or recourse to market-based correctives.  
 
112 Id. More recent expositions of this idea found in Ian Ayres and Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: 
Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 Yale L J 1027 (1995); Louis Kaplow and 
Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV L. REV. 713 
(1996); James E. Krier and Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in 
Another Light, 70 NYU L. REV. 440 (1995). 
113 Birks, UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2003). 
114 Ex Parte AmSouth Mortgage Co., 679 So. 2d 251, 255 (Ala. 1996); See also Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution, Tentative Draft No.1, § 5 Cmt f (discussing the role of negligence in restitution claims).  
115 See Banque Worms v. BankAmerica Intl., 570 N.E.2d 189, 192 (N.Y. 1991); see also Credit Lyonnais v. 
Koval, 745 So.2d 837 (Miss.1999). 
116 General Electric Capital Corp. v. Central Bank, 49 F.3d 280 (7th Cir. 1995) (Easterbrook, J.). 
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VI.  Doctrinal Restitution in America: The Restatement of Restitution 
In recent years, a small group of doctrinally-oriented American scholars have set 
out to draft a new Restatement (Third) of Restitution. In many ways this project follows 
the trail blazed by Commonwealth scholars, and stands out as a notable exception to the 
overall lack of interest displayed by American scholars.  The Restatement presents 
restitution as a coherent field based on the unifying principle of unjust enrichment,117 and 
generally resists the expansive, natural law imagery promoted by the post-realist 
redistribution camp.  Thus, the drafts of the Restatement claim that “instances of 
unjustified enrichment are both predictable and objectively determined,” since “the 
justification is legal not moral.”118 In contrast to both the right and left leaning camps of 
American scholars, the Restatement’s drafters demonstrate faith in the coherence and 
normative appeal of traditional doctrinal reasoning.119 
The differences between the Restatement and Commonwealth views are most 
visible in the context of restitution for unmarried cohabitants and in the Restatement’s 
position on the relationship between restitution and contract.  Regarding unmarried 
cohabitants, the English restitution canon contains little if any discussion of this topic.  
The question is not addressed in the latest edition of Goff and Jones, nor in Andrew 
 
117 See Discussion Draft § 1; At present, the drafts of the Restatement include the Discussion Draft; 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (Tentative Draft No. 1, April 2001); Restatement 
(Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (Tentative Draft No. 2, April 2002); Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (Tentative Draft No. 3, March 2004); Restatement (Third) of Restitution 
and Unjust Enrichment (Tentative Draft No. 4, April 2005) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 4].  In each 
draft, the ALI is careful to note that: 
As of the date of publication, this Draft has not been considered by the members of The 
American Law Institute and does not represent the position of the Institute on any of the 
issues with which it deals.  The action, if any, taken by the members with respect to this 
Draft may be ascertained by consulting the Annual Proceedings of the Institute, which are 
published following each Annual Meeting. 
Tentative Draft No. 4, supra, at i.  As used in this article, the term “Restatement” represents the views of 
tentative drafts which have not, as of yet, received the ALI’s sanction.  Nevertheless, participants at the 
ALI meetings have noted that Kull’s views face little to no opposition from the membership.  See Mark 
Gergen, The Restatement Third of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment at Midpoint, 56 Current Legal Probs. 
289, 291 n.10 (2003). See also Chaim Saiman, Restating Restitution 53 VILLA L. REV. __(2007).  
118 Discussion Draft, at § 1 Cmt. b; see also, Saiman, Restating Restitution.
119 See, e.g., Andrew Kull, Unilateral Mistake: The Baseball Card Case, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 57, 74-77 
(1992) (critiquing both left leaning redistributionalists as well as law and economics neo libertarians). 
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Burrows’ The Law of Restitution, nor in Steve Hedley’s The Law of Restitution, nor in 
Birks’ 1985 Introduction, nor his last book, Unjust Enrichment, nor in Graham Virgo’s 
The Principles of Restitution. The English writers telegraph that whatever its substantive 
merits, the question of unmarried cohabitants is a legislative problem that cannot be 
solved though private law litigation.120 
In line with the expansive definition of restitution pursued by the redistributive 
restitutionalists, Restatement § 28 supports claims for restitution between unmarried 
cohabitants.121 The Restatement is fully aware of the tension between the confined image 
of restitution and the unbounded, equitable flavor of § 28.  Thus “fundamental principles 
of restitution” must be “perceptibly relaxed” to accommodate this recovery within the 
Restatement’s overarching conceptual scheme.122 In America, even the most doctrinally 
oriented scholarship cannot avoid employing private law doctrines to structure social 
policy.  
 
While section 28 reflects incursion of left-leaning equitable restitution into the 
Restatement, what truly distinguishes the Restatement from Commonwealth accounts is 
the influence of the right leaning, contract-centric perspectives of the economic 
libertarians.  This theoretical orientation is most clearly spelled out in the scholarly 
writings of Andrew Kull, who serves as the principal drafter and leading figure behind 
the Restatement.123 For Kull, the very definition of restitution is framed by contract.  
Restitution is the law of “non-contractual transfers,”124 which makes it an “inevitably a 
 
120 See e.g., See Patrick Parkinson, Beyond Pettkus v. Becker, 43 U. Toronto L. J. 217, 220-23 (1993); E. 
Sherwin, Love, Money, and Justice: Restitution Between Cohabitants, 77 COLORADO L. REV. 711 (2006). 
See also Birks, Restitution and Resulting Trusts, in EQUITY AND CONTEMPORARY LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 
372 n.82 (Goldstein ed. 1992).   
121 Restatement (Third) of Restitution § 28. 
122 See id. In a more caustic vein, commentators have noted that the authorization of these claims “is 
inconsistent with the premises of the new Restatement and jeopardizes the task of rationalizing and taming 
the field,” which threatens to “set the field on a dangerous course.” Sherwin, Love, Money, and Justice: 
Restitution Between Cohabitants, 77 COLORADO L. REV. 711, 718, 732 (2006). 
123 Observers have noted that as Reporter, Andrew Kull has been able to exert an unusual amount of 
influence over the form and substance of the Restatement. See Mark Gergen, The Restatement Third of 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment at Midpoint, 56 Current Legal Problems 289, 291 n.10 (2003). 
124 Andrew Kull, Restitution and the Noncontractual Transfer, 11 Journal of Contract Law 1, 3 (1997).  
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disfavoured recourse.”125 Based on Levmore’s economic analysis, Kull argues that “the 
law strongly prefers. . . that [] transfers be made pursuant to contract wherever 
possible.”126 “Contract” thus “limits restitution: because contract is incomparably 
superior to restitution as a means of regulating a given transaction.”127 Kull concludes 
that restitution cases should be analyzed via reference to “the hypothetical contract that 
might have governed the parties’ transaction.”128 
Despite considerable diversity amongst Commonwealth scholars, I am unaware of 
any writer who expresses the primacy of contract over restitution in such stark terms.129 
The contrast becomes even sharper when comparing what each scholar views as the 
paradigmatic case in restitution.  For Birks, mistaken payment is the “core case” of 
restitution, such that “the law of unjust enrichment is the law of all events materially 
identical to the mistaken payment of a non-existent debt.”130 On this reading, restitution 
is the body of law that fills the vacuum created by a transfer that does not quite fit into 
any other legal category.  Kull by contrast, sees restitution as essentially a case of no-
contract.  Every transfer is therefore evaluated through the lens of the contract the parties 
could/should have entered into. 
 
These theoretical differences translate into substantive disagreements.  For 
example, in the now (in)famous Swaps Cases, the English courts grappled with what to 
do when interest rate swaps contracts between local governmental units and large 
European banks were deemed ultra vires of the local government’s constitutional power.  
Following Birks, the English courts held that since the ultra vires contracts were void, 
and thus irrelevant, the swaps contracts were to be analyzed as cases of mistaken 
 
125 Id. at 10. 
126 Id. at 4, (citing Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65 (1985)). 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 9. Kull’s academic analysis works its way into Restatement’s section 2 which claims that 
“transactions that give rise to a liability in restitution . . . take place outside the framework of an 
enforceable contract or otherwise without the effective consent of one or both of the parties.”  
129 See Steve Hedley, Restitution: Contract’s Twin in FAILURE OF CONTRACTS at 272 n.136 (F.D. Rose 
ed.1997) (pointing out that Professor Kull, more than almost any other restitution scholar, insists on the 
primacy of contract over restitution; Mark Gergen, Restitution and Contract: Reflections on the Third 
Restatement, 13 RESTITUTION LAW REVIEW 224 (2004) (noting that the Restatement’s commitment to the 
independence of contract law and its and preference over restitution claims is significantly stronger than the 
position of Peter Birks and other leading commonwealth scholars).  
130 Birks, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 3 (2003). 
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payments to be reversed because of the unjust enrichment that would occur if each side 
got to keep the payments made under the contract.  The resolution of these cases rested 
solely on the rules embedded in the law of restitution, as the courts gave no consideration 
to the intentions of the contracting parties. 
 
The Restatement disagrees.  Consistent with its theory that restitution is the law of 
no contract, the Restatement resists a resolution where rules of law replace the all-but-
formally valid contractual agreement of the parties.  Contrary to the English view, the 
Restatement conceptualizes the ultra vires swaps as failed contracts to be enforced in a 
way that most closely approximates the parties’ ex ante agreement.  Thus in cases where 
both sides fully performed the contract, and even when the contract is later ruled void ab 
initio, the Restatement finds no unjust enrichment because each side received the 
performance its bargained for performance.131 While this result necessarily diminishes 
the significance of the ultra vires finding—since the contract will in essence be 
enforced—the Restatement is willing to pay this price in order to affirm the centrality of 
private ordering and contract with the domain of private law. 
 
Despite its strong ties to Commonwealth scholarship, the Restatement offers a 
distinctly American version of restitution.  The Restatement parts both analytically and 
substantively from the Commonwealth discourse, and as compared to Commonwealth 
writing, deemphasized internal analytic coherence in favor of the methods and insights of 
post-realist U.S. scholarship. 
 
VII.   Conclusion 
 
The Restatement stakes out a middle position by taking the core of the Birksean 
frame and modifying it to comport with more realist U.S. sensibilities.  For this reason, 
the Restatement represents the most promising attempt to reestablish restitution within 
U.S. legal consciousness.  Thus the Restatement’s reception into the fabric of American 
 
131 See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 33 cmt g; Mark Gergen, Restitution and Contract: Reflections on 
the Third Restatement, 13 RESTITUTION LAW REVIEW 224 (2004).  
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legal thought serves as a reasonable proxy for assessing the future of restitution in 
America more generally.  
 
At one level, the Restatement is an unqualified success.  It usefully collects and 
summarizes a number of diffuse and little understood doctrines into a concise, handy 
compendium.  Viewed as a thought-out, clear and up to date treatise on the law of 
restitution, the Restatement is an unqualified success.  Therefore, to the extent courts 
conceptualize their cases as raising restitution issues, they will look to the Restatement;
especially given the lack of alternate sources of guidance and the overall lack of 
competence in the field.132 But inasmuch as the Restatement harbors the broader 
ambitions of charting out a map of private law that re-conceptualizes an entire field along 
the English/Birksean model, success is far less likely.  The Restatement will have 
difficulty selling the rationalized view of restitution to the American legal public.  
Restitution issues will likely continue to be interpreted as remedies for breach of contract 
(looking to the Restatement Second of Contracts rather than the Restatement of 
Restitution for guidance), specific doctrines at the margins of property and/or trust law, or 
questions that depend on (direct or interstitial) interpretation of the U.C.C. (e.g. Article 
4A dealing fund transfers between banks) or the Federal Bankruptcy Code.133 
Similarly, the influence of the legal economists will likely channel courts towards 
the values of efficiency and finality and away from rewinding transactions as to correct 
unjust enrichment.  Hard questions will be resolved by placing the risk of loss on the 
cheapest cost avoider, or by structuring relief so as to incentivize market transactions, so 
that unjust enrichment barely enters the equation.  Crossing over to the other end of the 
spectrum, it is difficult to imagine that a large scale redistributive project (which 
 
132 See Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1195 (1995) (“To put it bluntly, 
American lawyers today (judges and law professors included) do not know what restitution is. The subject 
is no longer taught in law schools, and the lawyer who lacks an introduction to its basic principles is 
unlikely to recognize them in practice. The technical competence of published opinions in straightforward 
restitution cases has noticeably declined; judges and lawyers sometimes fail to grasp the rudiments of the 
doctrine even when they know where to find it.”). 
133 See In re Omegas Group, Inc., 16 F.3d 1443 (6th Cir. 1994); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. S.S. American 
Lancer, 686 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff 'd, 870 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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consciously looks to stretch the limits of exiting doctrine) will be derailed because it does 
not conformably fit into the Restatement’s positivized conception of restitution. 
 
Much the same can be said of the American “law of restitution” itself.  To the 
extent that some issues are conceptualized as restitution questions, the law of restitution 
will exist and perhaps even thrive.  And as Lon Fuller pointed out, the moral intuition 
encapsulated by the term “unjust enrichment” will continue to play a role in working out 
legal questions no matter what doctrinal heading is formally in play.  But I do not foresee 
that courts will begin to conceptualize contract, bankruptcy, corporate, intellectual 
property or U.C.C. questions in terms of restitution.  The anti-doctrinalism exhibited by 
both sides of the ideological divide renders the American legal landscape inhospitable to 
the analytical insights offered by the Commonwealth’s account of restitution.  
 
One final note to drive this point home.  Over the past two generations, nearly 
every American innovation in legal thought has been built on decidedly post-realist 
foundations. Maturing and emerging fields include: animal law, art law, health care law, 
child law, elder law, various forms of cyber and computer law, disability law, 
environmental law, Indian law, natural resource law, lawyering for the President, 
terrorism and the law, WTO law—to name but a few. 134 Unlike restitution, these areas 
have not arisen because scholars have finally unearthed some central conceptual principle 
underlying each area of the law.  Rather, each is premised on the understanding that 
important institutions and recurring forms of transactional activity warrant the attention 
of legal scholars.   
 
Restitution moves in the opposite direction.  Instead of framing legal issues in 
terms of family law, banking law, consumer protection, mass tort litigation, local 
government law, insurance law, securities regulation, corporate law and others, the law of 
 
134 Taken from the Harvard Law School course catalogue (2006). For example, with respect to animal law 
see www.law.harvard.edu/news/2001/06/13_animals.php (announcing Harvard Law School’s receipt of 
endowment to support teaching and research in the emerging field of animal rights law); 
www.law.umich.edu/_ClassSchedule/aboutCourse.asp?crse_id=038599 (describing University of Michigan 
Law School’s course in animal law); see also, e.g., ANIMAL RIGHTS (Cass Sunstein and Martha Nussbaum 
eds.) (Oxford University Press 2004). See also Saiman, surpa note __.  
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restitution is framed around the legal-analytical category of unjust enrichment.  This 
organization is more in-line with the classical scheme of the late nineteenth century when 
law was considered in terms of tort, contract, agency, partnership, bailments, sales, 
property, equity and trusts; the doctrinal subjects that have fallen far out of scholarly 
favor in the U.S. 
 
For this reason, it is perhaps not surprising that an informal poll of professors at 
two of the top five ranked U.S. law schools revealed that roughly half were completely 
unaware of the ongoing Restatement of Restitution project.135 There has likewise been 
little scholarly reaction to the Restatement (compared say, to the Restatement Third of 
Torts), and roughly half of the commentary that does exist is anchored, at least in part, 
outside the U.S.136 As I have argued, the Commonwealth approach to restitution is 
largely predicated on a pre-realist conception of legal thought that overlooks much of 
twentieth century American legal scholarship, and is therefore unlikely to become of 
significant interest to American scholars and judges.   
 
135 Interestingly, the most recent meeting of the American Association of Law Schools (January 2007), 
featured a daylong workshop dedicated to remedies. One of the session panels was dedicated to restitution 
and the emerging Restatement. However, despite featuring the leading U.S. restitution scholars (Andrew 
Kull, Mark Gergen, Emily Sherwin and Candace Kovacic-Fleischer), this session drew an attendance of 
only approximately 15 people. By contrast, a parallel panel titled “remedies for contract” drew a 
significantly larger attendance form the American law professoriate. 
136 To the best of my knowledge, the reviews of the Restatement Third of Restitution include, Emily 
Sherwin, Love, Money, and Justice: Restitution Between Cohabitants, 77 COLORADO L. REV. 711 (2006); 
Peter Linzer, Rough Justice: A Theory of Restitution and Reliance, Contracts and Torts, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. 
695;  Chaim Saiman, Restating Restitution, supra note __; James Rogers, Restitution for Wrongs and the 
Restatement (Third) of the Law of Restitution, http://ssrn.com/abstract=927979 (2006); Mark Gergen, 
Restitution and Contract: Reflections on the Third Restatement, 13 RESTITUTION LAW REVIEW 224 (2004); 
Mark Gergen, The Restatement Third of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment at Midpoint, 56 Current Legal 
Problems 289 (2003); Perter Birks, A Letter to America, GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIER; Hanoch Dagan LAW 
AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION (2004).  
Of these articles, only four (Sherwin, Saiman, Linzer and Rogers) were written by a U.S.-based 
scholar and published in a U.S. law journal.  Mark Gergen, a professor at University of Texas, published 
his two reviews of the Restatement in English journals. Dagan’s book frequently critiques the Restatement 
but is not a product of American scholarship, nor is the book published by an American press. Birks of 
course was an English scholar who published his letter in an international journal.   
 
